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>> GAYATRI KHANDHADAI: Hi. We are about a few minutes late, but I think we can start now, right? Welcome to the last session for today in this room at least. I'm Gayatri. I work with APC on a project called Impact which works on India, Malaysia and Pakistan and our focus is on how to use technology to impact or create change. The topic we are quite passionate about and we wanted to discuss a bit with you on is freedom of association and Assemblies online. Oftentimes our protests are associations are looked at as just forms of expression, right? But there is an additional layer of qualification when we protest online and get together a group of like-minded people or when we get together as a group of people with a particular aim in mind, no? So we wanted to also look at that act of getting together of voicing opinions together as a group, an additional right of freedom of assembly and association online. As far as APC has been trying to look at this particular right of freedom of assembly and association online, the way we have been approaching it is the use of ICT platforms or ICT tools to either exercise freedom of assembly and association online purely or the use of these tools and platforms to ultimately exercise freedom of assembly and association offline.

So we are kind of looking at both these aspects. And one of the

things that we wanted to do a bit different with this session was to not have a lot of talking just from a few people. We are going to be trying this out with you. If you could log in to slido.com, if you just log in to slido.com and our code is 727. Do you want to explain it?

>> It is an anonymous chat room. I am sure you have all used it. So you can ask any question and it will show up magically or you can vote on each other's questions and it is anonymous by default.

>> GAYATRI KHANDHADAI: So you don't have to wait until everyone is done for you to ask your questions. If there is something that comes up, type it in and we'll see how to interact on that. So the way we have picked up today and it is a panel of a lot of my favorite people and the way we have picked the panel today to have a sort of mixed bag here. We have, of course, have friends from the region who will be reflecting on how Civil Society perceives freedom of assembly and association online in their respective jurisdictions. And then we also have Ankhi with us who is going to talk about Facebook is the most prominent platform in the region we assemble. And then we also have colleagues in the region who have been coming up with alternative ways to push back against the pushback from the state, no?

So that to me that's a section that I'm really looking forward to hear, how can we pick up and feel empowered to exercise our rights. We will start with Mimi. Introduce yourself first and tell us how in Malaysia freedom of assembly and association has been spanning out on the Internet.

>> So hello everyone. I'm -- my name is Mimi. I am working with EMPOWER. It is an organisation that works towards Human Rights, especially on women's rights issues as well as Internet rights. In Malaysia we are looking for -- we are currently doing a census research on freedom of assembly and association. So it is related to the recent case of Bersih. Online spaces has become one of the tools to create movement, especially Civil Society movement. So I think that's it for the introduction.

>> GAYATRI KHANDHADAI: You want to go in to a couple of examples? Freedom of assembly and association have been strongly exercised online?

>> Yeah. One of (audio cutting out).

(Technical difficulties)

>> But again I would not want to just pick on the negatives, but there are some positive stories alongside as well. For example, there was this campaign called Claim your Mosques. That was started in an online space which actually we saw also resulting in an offline protest. And it was about religion, because it is -- I will just give you some background. But there is a business mosque in the capital city run by a cleric called and he has very extremist ideas. And he is supporting ISIS and all these extremist groups. Unfortunately

right now I can say in terms of regulation were not very much going in the right track, but we have been trying to push that back, for example. It is called prevention of electronic crime bill which is overcriminalizing some of the activities that you do online, especially in context of, you know, marginalized groups in the country. They are not, you know, freely able to assemble themselves in offline spaces. So online was one secure way for them, for example, LGBT groups in the country because they set a backlash from religious extremists.

So one of the websites that got blocked on the Internet was run by the LGBTI group people and they were trying to assemble together and have a set of like-minded people and talk about ideas and talk about sexuality and exchange their views on that. And the website got blocked by authorities. So this is one -- another negative example of how freedom of association and assembly online is being curbed online. And I can continue going further on examples, but I think I will stop here.

>> GAYATRI KHANDHADAI: We will have several rounds I guess. Two of the key points you made perhaps national security and religion are the most commonly cited pretext for violation and the fact that new groups are finding that new found voice online. So given that context we should perhaps move to Ming. What has been the experience in Vietnam, especially with your work in creating an alternative space for these people to have that assembly and association?

>> Hello. I am Ming and I used to be an activist in Vietnam. I found my own organisation and we are working -- at first we work on climate change, but then we spread out to different topics, like the LGBT and Human Rights and education, for example. And in Vietnam -- I want to put a little context first. That we have to suffer from all the sensors like other country. We used to be blocked by the -- Facebook used to be blocked in Vietnam for a long time and we get back a few years ago. But every time that there is a protest in the country they block the traffic to Facebook. And it also -- they can also block the SMS, some key word and sometimes they say that shocked by the cable under the sea. So now Internet shut down, something like that. So after many years of working as an activist we found that we need a stronger platform for the activists to organize their campaign. You know, that's us and when you open -- when you organize your campaign it is a lot of interest that you need to support online. When you organize an event you need the people to release and you need to, how to say, need to manage on the participation and sometimes the police just come to the hotel, come to the conference and shut down the Internet, the electricity and you need to report to all the participants to move to another place.

So it is really hard for organizers to manage everything like that in such a short time. So we are trying to build a platform that can provide different events, competition, volunteer recruitment and

even donation and like craft funding that insider platform that people can be invited and announce and learning when involved in an event in the campaign. And they can get the notification when a news event, a new protest or new meeting will happen. But I have to say that it can be blocked by the Government also. So it is like a technical problem that we cannot solve by a new platform. Yeah.

>> GAYATRI KHANDHADAI: A platform that's been existing for awhile and has become an integral part of many of our lives. So I am going to keep my question about Facebook, is that given especially in countries like India, Malaysia and Pakistan most of the momentum building happens on platforms like Facebook and Twitter. So how does Facebook view these sorts of attempts by the state to shut down freedom of assembly and association? Do you also see it as a violation of your right to function freely? And how has Facebook been responding to this?

>> Demographics in these countries are very young. So we do have a very robust knowledge of these countries. So I still would like to see a young platform engaging a very young audience. But you raise a much more fundamental point and something that we are seeing jumping up quite a bit in South Asia and Southeast Asia as well. And the trend line is essentially there are the following instruments which are being used in terms of effectuating network shutdowns. So one of the questions pop up where somebody asks sort of a clarification as to whether this was a shutdown or not of the Internet or whether it was a shutdown of mobile networks. In some instances a bit of both but what has become routine in a lot of countries is the kill switch on mobile Internet. And what is happening in a lot of national legislations which exist in India as well as in other neighboring countries it is written in to the blocking provisions as written in to the ISP licenses, in the national Telecom regulation which exists in a lot of these countries. And therefore whenever there is a law and order problem, law enforcement agencies as well as Governments, both federal and subfederal in cases where there is a Federal Government which is in power routinely authorizes issuance of orders, blocking orders which essentially means that your entire network is going to be shut down. The mobile Internet is going to be shut down. We have had -- up until now we have had ten mobile Internet blockings across various states and this does not include (inaudible). That has been -- that has been the frequency with which this has been used. So also used in other countries.

The reason most often which is advanced is one of the national security and as events have shown in our region and you are aware of this, the frequency of the terrorist acts have grown. There are legitimate concerns that national agencies and Governments have in terms of making sure they are keeping people safe and fighting terror. As far as Facebook is concerned and our policies are concerned we generally do not -- I mean associated position and we have made that

very clear. We have taken positions on this. We are -- our mission is to help build more a open and connected world. We are a very mission driven company and that's the basis of the company philosophy, but we also recognize and we see the strength that increasingly the world is becoming more closed and from Brexit and what have you are all indications of that, either on the economic opportunity side or in terms of free expression. And that's something that's very worrisome. We have constantly advocated for open and free Internet. We also cited this particular instance that the United States -- I mean the cybersecurity command control even in regions which have been designated as ISIS territories and actions against terrorists are going on the Internet has not been shut down in those areas because they are a disservice to the local populations which can be caused as a consequence of that shutdown is far more than the harm which could be caused by those networks being up. And also I mean if you're Europe, if you look at after the Brussels attack or even the kind of periodic attacks which is happening there is no network shutdown that is happening. And I think this particular part of the world has to recognize that the value of keeping the system up is much more than shutting it down. One could argue that these platforms could be used for counter speech.

So we have been advocating a lot in terms of using the platform and talking about the value of counter speech and the value of communities and Governments to use this in crisis situations. At the same time we are also working through various coalitions in different countries to make sure that we are shining the light in terms of bad regulation which exists in terms of given full to these kind of repetitive shutdowns. In terms of our responding, I mean that is how we sort of deal with shutdowns as on a principle basis.

In India we had this very egregious action which was struck down by the Supreme Court after a long fight, 66A which chilled a lot of expression on the Internet and that came after -- that came after a long fight. And it went to the courts. And another trend line that we are seeing is that eventually a lot of the Civil Society actors, public intellectuals, companies and platforms will have to come together and form these kind of coalitions and really exercise options and seek judicial review to get a lot of these laws either repealed through a judicial review process or wrote down. That is what we are seeing in India to a certain extent. I think in Pakistan as well. These are the kinds of things that we are seeing in terms of seeking a judicial review and getting corrective measures as a consequence of those judicial review. So that is what I am seeing in the region and that's the approach as a company.

>> GAYATRI KHANDHADAI: Thanks. I wanted to ask you a very specific question. Given that this is the state of affairs, there is only that much we can do because we are reliant to a great extent on the state to do what they are doing. What can we do as citizens

when we want to protest or when we want to assemble or associate? What can we do differently to an extent presents or lets us exercise that right?

>> So your question is given that state is interstate and what can a Civil Society and the citizens do to effect trivial change. Because here is Taiwan, my standard answer is going to be that you occupy the Parliament for 22 days because that's what happened here in 2014 and it did affect a lot of changes. And because we occupied the Parliament not just for protests it is a demonstration, not in the traditional sense which is just protesting but the demonstration in the Internet sense which is a demo implementation of a proof of concept. We occupy the Parliament for 22 days, but during those 22 days what we did was demonstrating a new kind of deliberation process and new talk that comes up with real Consensus uniting the activists that are previously divided. And we used exactly the same technologies like stenography or realtime broadcasting or transcription to affect change. Once they see this is possible the demand they have on the state changes instead of having state change and this is concrete or proof of concept always trumps talk. Running code always works.

>> GAYATRI KHANDHADAI: I have another question. So given that we have very specific challenges, but given the practical challenges if the state shuts down the network, so what do we do?

>> Right. So during the occupy, we did not have an Internet shutdown. We had a meltdown because the 3G network was not up to have a million people on the streets and the electricity was cut and not the Internet was cut. Not just land line but mobile, but everything around the occupied area. So we built everything from the ground up, cable, radio, power. We used the WiMEX spectrum. And we used Fire Chat to do passing messages around and we set up local decision making stations like Lumino based on local hosting. If you have a sufficient number of activists who are also trained in mesh networking you can get a working Internet to have a million people in a reasonable degree. But it works reasonably so that people can organize themselves.

>> GAYATRI KHANDHADAI: Any one of you would like to add or anything you want to show or shall we move to -- yeah. Maybe we -- we should probably look at some of the comments. They seemed really interesting. Is there anything here that you would like to respond to?

>> A specific question which I saw which wanted to understand what is the specifics of Facebook advocating against shutdown. I think we have taken very open positions in opposing shutdowns in a variety of countries and this has come from founder level statements, RCO and founder Mark Zuckerberg has taken to Facebook in terms of protesting and also opposing shutdowns as a core value and a principle. Recently with the shutdown of one of our family of apps which is what's up, there was solid opposition expressed to that. We expressed

opposition to that. In addition what we are doing in the South Asia region we have been part of various industry association, Internet industry association efforts to oppose these kind of blanket bands and these kind of shutdowns. We are also currently evaluating and this is something I think it is important to do that, to do that and put this on paper to get Governments to understand this, the economic harm of shutdown that has to be quantified to the Government. They use shutdowns as a mechanism to quell, protest and they do not understand -- they do not fully embrace or appreciate the economic harm which is caused by shutdown -- by Internet shutdowns and network shutdowns. So the time has come to sort of quantify that in a fairly robust way and explain to them the net loss to jobs, economic growth which is caused by these network shutdowns. And once that happens maybe a joint advocacy on the economic harm side and joint side will be enough to clearly establish that this is not a good idea. This is not a sustainable idea and it is not a good idea. So we have to come up with very strong economic arguments to convince them this is not the right part which any country should be embarking on.

>> I think I want to put on a little bit that in Vietnam the Government they have quite a smart strategy to shut down the network. Normally only they shut down half the traffic of Facebook, only in Facebook and only in a big city that is hard for people to receive the information about the protests and to update the information about the protests. And this has just come back right after the protest finished. And they never agreed that they shut down the network. And the problem is no one knows why and for three years they block Facebook and they never say they block Facebook. And there is a technical problem of ISP. And for the Internet shutdown, they place some kind of car with hardware to destroy the signal. So it is trying to redo the economic loss of the shutting down.

>> Yeah.

>> GAYATRI KHANDHADAI: Maybe we can take some questions and comments in addition.

>> Hi. My name is Mario. And I am the President/founder. My question is that recently we came across a case where a famous Pakistani celebrity who is very well-known on Facebook, Humzali, two of his posts were taken down by Facebook and his account was deactivated and reactivated and Facebook apologized. He was protesting against the killing of Internet activists for freedom. Both times Facebook just decided on its own that these were banned words and these posts should be taken down and only after much approval were they put back on. And so I want to know how do you decide, I mean based on those hashtags and also a lot of content is being shared which is in regional languages like Pesho, but I also see being a speaker that I get messages from Facebook that say can you help us translate this or that. While this translation is happening there is 51% done already and more being done on Pesho. How come you are

unable to put censorship on those? And even if I come to you and I translate it for you and there are 50 other people voting and this is something that comes in to harassment and you should shut it down, those pages still don't get it shut down. How do you work around that?

>> Yeah, so I think, first of all, I want to dissociate this entire terminology of censorship because it is not what we do. Facebook is an intermediary and we are sort of the principal that apply in taking down the system. So people routinely flag content. We have mechanism of 24/7 review. We are increasingly building language capability in terms of looking at regional language content when they get reported to us. And as there was another session which was happening earlier and local language content capacity is just a hard problem to solve. It is just like hard to have 100% local language capability. It is a very hard problem to solve and platforms are working on smart transliteration tools and also looking at having more and more human reviewers who have the right language capacity to look at these questions. It is a global problem and complex problem and it is not 100% perfect. There are so many kinds of different languages in this whole wide world but only ten languages which dominate the Internet. Like 80% of the Internet is dominated by only ten languages. In terms of the specifics of the case, I mean I have some recollection of it but not a whole lot in terms of what actually happened. But just to -- as an example of the types of things which happen and that's -- I'm going to refer to that as an example of types of things which happen. So when a piece of -- when a user community flags content to us we have teams which are reviewing these kind of escalations for violation of international standards and also violation of our community standards. And if it is a violation it goes down as part of that process because they are like billions of pieces of content that get reported. We don't make mistakes. And when that gets highlighted to which is why we believe in having active dialogue with community groups and Civil Society Organizations and as they get flagged to us we reinvestigate that and that gets restored as happened in this particular case.

In the more edgier case which you talked about there is valorization of terrorization. We do not allow terrorist content on our platform. It is a very clear sort of declaration which is made in our terms of service and in our community standards. And very clearly if somebody is on the DTO list and if there is DTO, designated terrorist organisation list, and there is valorization of our celebration of terrorism which potentially could be used as recruitment material we will definitely take that down. If there is content that is talking about terrorist activities to raise bad effects of terrorism, that's a different story. But glorification of terror acts, valorization of terror is a violation of standards and those will go down. I hope that answers your question.

>> GAYATRI KHANDHADAI: There are a lot of questions, but a lot

of it seems to be directed to Facebook. We want to take a quick break and see if there is questions and also more importantly recommendations we have as a group here on how do we deal with these sort of pushbacks and violations. Anything around the room that anybody has to contribute? No? Okay.

>> Hello. I just wanted to make a comment that, you know, these comments on authorities when they try to block Internet or communications or shut down websites or whatever, I think they need to be more rationalized on what they are doing. For example, this earlier example I was giving of this cleric in Islamabad. And we were all wondering what's happening, what's the reason. And then eventually we found out that this cleric is actually streaming his Friday sermons which are very extremist views, he is sharing on this channel. And the Government instead of, you know, stopping that person, they have actually stopped the public to access communications on Internet and phones. So all the businesses on Friday, all the communications, hospitals, everything emergency you needed was stopped just because this cleric was giving sermons and he was streaming it. I think it is on the Government and on the authorities to see what they are doing and how they can stop a problematic speech, for example. So that's something I wanted to share as well.

>> GAYATRI KHANDHADAI: Okay. Ankhil has to leave. I think you took a lot of our questions and thanks a lot for clarifying a lot of that. So if there -- is there anything else that -- yeah.

>> I think there is one also, one very I mean important challenge which we are facing on the Internet today, particularly from the content provider side like Facebook and other social media platform. We don't have a mechanism to probably identify the authenticity of the content. So there are all kinds of rumors which goes on to the content provider network which the end persons are not sure -- and they get carried away with those contents. And like we have seen in India, the cases of rights which are happening in Myanmar and they have been posted as being from Indian states. And it ridiculizes the common public. And they find an easy way of shutting down the network. I am not supporting that, but there is a challenge that the technological community has to answer. I want to ask the community here particularly from a technology perspective is there any -- I mean is there any move in that direction?

>> GAYATRI KHANDHADAI: Okay. There are a couple of questions there. So can we take those two and try to --

>> I am really glad that you raised the point. I was going to raise them. The official website of the organizer was shut down but that doesn't cause troubles because people relied on Facebook for dissemination of information. What we see is a slue of misinformation, but the organizer has to take a lot of efforts to verify every single information. And this is used by Governments as an excuse to take legal actions against the people. And on top of that we are also seeing

how platforms like Facebook are being used to perpetrate harassment against the organizer who was a woman. So her photos, a group of people's meet up and huge -- a live poster of her and just splash her paint on her and these photos were circulated online. Also sexist comments were being made.

So while the Internet has helped with FAO online but there is also the other aspect that we have to look at. There is a need to balance freedom of expression against our rights to privacy, especially for women and the LGBT community. Thank you.

>> (Off microphone).

>> Okay. It is also -- I have a thought to share as well.

(Laughter).

>> Hi. I am Mika from the Philippines, Internet Freedom Alliance. When we talk about the private sector we talked about intermediaries, but we should also talk about there is a slice of the private sector which is the corporate media, no? That can also affect our right of freedom of association and assembly online and offline. Something called in the Philippines called the Million People March where there was hundreds of thousands of people organised themselves and went to a National Park and protest against the pork burial of -- the legislators in the Government -- legislators and this protest was actually organised online and organisers were really anonymous. Like they were -- some of them were like thinking or they wanted to remain anonymous and they don't want to like take responsibility on this particular assembly, no? So they don't want -- they don't want to be interviewed by the media. They don't want to tell the people that there are like organised groups that are, you know, organising this protest rally. Simply because it is like a spontaneous action.

There is -- someone just posted the Facebook event page and he invited people maybe we can, you know, have a picnic in this National Park. And then people like started clicking going and, you know, and this has just gone viral. So the thing is corporate media would want to talk about this event in the national television and they wanted to ask who are the organisers. And, you know, and there is this -- the people who just, you know, created the event page doesn't really want to say that they are the organisers. They just posted something online and wanted to invite people and tell people, but there are, you know, the media would like to know and they wanted to try to investigate and investigate and investigate and just know who these people are. And these people don't really want to be identified because it compromises their -- it will compromise them. And in turn -- and in effect it can -- this right to anonymity that has been compromised can also lead to restriction on the right of freedom of association. I mean on the right of freedom of association and assembly. I am sharing this story in the Philippines and that can happen in many different countries.

>> GAYATRI KHANDHADAI: We have looked at online violations

being contained in the online space and there is a very serious and dangerous, especially in a country like Bangladesh, recently a LGBT activist was hacked to death. He was running a group for supporting other LGBT persons in the state. And the way he was identified was really because the state was clamping down on those sort of associations and assemblies. Several bloggers have been killed and have used them to mobilize people against state policies when it came to religion and religious issues. In Pakistan we have several instances there have been severe offline consequences for these violations. We will go back to the question you asked about the technological challenges after this one.

>> Thank you. My name is Kenny, council member of APNIC. I am a little bit lost because I have been sitting here listening and some sort of outage or content. But I am not sure because there is content or (inaudible) could be serious quality issue, could be company internal policy, regulation issue, could be domestic jurisdiction issues. I am not sure what kind of issue caused that kind of problem. Is anything Internet Governance can do to mitigate that situation or harmonize the global accessibility for Human Rights? Thank you.

>> GAYATRI KHANDHADAI: I am glad you asked that question because it relates to two other comments made here because there was a couple of comments here about what have platforms done against network shutdowns and who are these people asking for network shutdowns. Given is there some clarity on how you are identifying that network shutdowns are in response to freedom of assembly and association?

>> Three kind of network shutdowns. Yeah. Okay. Sorry. So three levels of network shutdowns. One is Telecom network shutdown completing that ISP and the Telecom has been asked to not provide the services. In a case of like money per case or certain case of phone network and another case when the blocking has been happening at the Telecom level. There have been cases like goes beyond application level. Facebook has been blocked because of certain other reasons. For example, like beef is banned in India right now. There is a social kind of a barrier there. Second is that students should not do the cheating. So the (inaudible) has been blocked. One is a Telecom layer blocking and the second is application layer blocking. The reasons what it has been given as well to maintain the social stability. These things have been given in these network shutdowns. This network shutdown has been what reasons -- what are the specific reasons that you are blocking those networks. Okay?

And I am forgetting another set of questions what he has asked as well.

>> What Internet Governance Forums do to address --

>> The counter speech is important. If it is important that we can do -- we can occupy that space, that this is -- do live telecasting, ways we can occupy that space and use alternative technology. This is not the misinformation should not lead it from if it says role

kind of space. That would be really helpful. Like in a case of a money per case, certain things were happening in Bangalore and when people were traveling from Bangalore to their location of a money pool there was a mention of total -- was happening but mislead of information which was replicated drastically. This could be the one solution. Even in platforms like what we have seen in the one case when there is a politician who was talking about that -- about you might be aware of the politician has come out that girls should not wear short dresses. Location from the other city there were -- people in the other city came out. People from the private sector and young generation came out wearing short dresses. And specifically they were men and showing that we are allowed to wear short dresses. So even though mobilization can happen the one Facebook post can help the other people to protest that way.

>> GAYATRI KHANDHADAI: I just want to add, I think this will cover it brilliantly but this is an ongoing issue in India. It is not accidental. On a particular day I am having Internet and then suddenly a protest starts. For a whole week everything has been going fine and then a protest starts and suddenly the network disappears. If it happens once or twice it is different. Other groups in India have done an extensive study that shows clearly when network shutdowns have been imposed.

The second thing they give orders to the Telecom authorities to shut it down. They ask them to do what we referred to as kill switch. They asked them to shut the whole network down. And the third reason that we definitely know this is a systemic issue. One of the lawyers went to court to shut down the network and unfortunately the court -- I don't think the court was ready at that point to look at the issue at length. The way the court saw it, if you are imposing emergency or if you are imposing a public order situation, just like how we can say people should come out to the streets we can also say you can't have telecommunications for a particular period of time, but the court has not looked at what happens to health services, what happens to emergency services and what happens to the economic sector. That's completely been blind sided in that case. And I also wanted to kind of respond to your question on Internet Governance which is at the heart of this whole discussion. What do we do? The point Ankhi made is important. I think right now there is no recognition that network shutdowns is against our rights. I think that's actually the problem. Network shutdowns have been seen as a practical solution. And while at the general level we have been successful in getting Internet rights recognized as Human Rights. And there have been resolutions at that level and efforts made to address the particular issue of network shutdowns and states have to be able to talk to each other. And this might not be a great idea. That's really what has to be discussed.

>> Exactly what they are saying, but just I wanted to add a little

bit point to it. That in Pakistan the Telecom companies when they get orders from the Government they have started to actually send SMSs to the users telling in advance that is the day that the network will be off. On National Tour day on the 23rd of March and there was Army everywhere housing parade, three days prior to that event the network was starting to cut off. So that's how -- I think it is -- I think we need to look in to it because this is one way of actually trying to legitimize. And that we are telling you in advance you that you make alternative arrangements and without mobile phones what kind of alternative arrangements we would make because land lines don't deliver --

>> GAYATRI KHANDHADAI: We have Gopal and one question.

>> Gopal also from Pakistan. I just wanted to also provide a little bit more back in to what we did and (inaudible) it is actually quite transparent and often the Government announces itself. Sometimes it doesn't. We can always tell when it is a breakdown in accident and breakdowns don't happen across every Telecom provider at the same time. So these are kill orders. The issue here is, you know, we also need to talk about one is a rights approach, of course. The other is that it is like killing the messenger and not the message because often it is happening even with electronic media, not just with online. For example, there are some organisations which are banned. And these are extremist organisations. And however they are carrying on their activities publicly on the roles in their invisible areas but the media is asked not to cover them. So the issue is you go and get the actual on the ground activity if it is illegal. You are making it illegal, excommunication to the masses. Similarly if children are cheating, you take care of the cheating, we have to point out these anomalies. There are several, even -- every Friday and that is done -- it is in the capital. It is like less than a kilometer to -- the mosque from all the important national buildings like the top intelligence agency, Parliament and presidency. But the Government goes and shuts down our networks. There are other issues connected to all of this and we have to recognize those as well. And we have to challenge Governments over those.

>> Yeah.

>> Thanks.

>> I have a question to, sorry, yeah, to Audrey. Very interesting. The story you say about how people also learned about the process of democracy. So you are saying it is developing a different form of democracy and participation. I would like to know after that event have you -- what sort of impact has it made? Do you see any changes? Is there more democracy and in what way has it happened?

>> GAYATRI KHANDHADAI: Can you take this question as well as on what do we do with the technology?

>> I have some slides. Sure. While the slide is showing, okay.

>> So I think what have been in Taiwan is really interesting.

I think one of the biggest challenges when it comes to a protest is how do you allow the right informations to actually flow and not to be controlled by Government. So how do you make sure that what actually happens inside was sent or represented by media or other platforms.

>> So I actually have five minutes very short slides, but that deals with the two questions. So if you would allow me. Taiwan has a very long history of military dictatorship and censorship that was lifted around the end of the '80s. The personal computer Internet arrived at a time. We continue to have fights about the freedom of assembly and association in the early part of this century, but I would first echo the rights-based approach. It is the only working approach that this is the Human Rights Council United Nations earlier this July. They passed a translation, part of Article 19 saying, you know, states it is a very bad idea to prevent or disrupt access to anything that's online. And when we last had this kind of contest it was between commercial interest. And this is something very much like on the stop online piracy act. Exactly as Dr. Wong has said. They don't have a lot of idea in the Internet Governance. As a coalition from the Civil Society and private sector we blacked out our website taking a page from the SOP movement and urge people to ask this is the website I maintain and mobilize maybe millions of people per month. They did write thousands of e-mails and they did cave in after 24 hours saying okay. Really bad idea.

We have to rethink it. And the other thing is that cyber bullying, like the terror recruitment must be curtailed and not confused with the blockage of the Internet and like the Communication Decency Act in 2013, the national communication commission had this very bad idea of allowing IP and the DNS level blocking over the cyber bullying speech. It was blocked by people inside the speech. He was the Minister of cyberspace and was the leader of DPP, now our President. So the idea is to get a few people in the Government administration or in an opposition party to understand what IPv6 means. And they would stand up and refuse this kind of thing and about making the flow of information flow faster. This is actually from Dr. Kenny's speech last year. In any case this is the occupation slide but this is the topology.

So the people who are in the occupy place see the street and the people in the street see the occupy places. So that there is really no room for the rumor to spread and we have a stenographer typing everything that is said. Once we do that there is no room for rumors to spread. And we do that because the community in Taiwan already had this kind of experience working with the Facebook. We had news help, Chrome extension or browser extension. If you install when this information spreads, it shows a warning. It says you may be a victim to counterfeit information and it is a crowd source way to curtail misinformation. To answer the idea, the question about how did the

occupiers do, the occupiers won their local elections. One of them went on to be the mayor and the national government basically started to use IETF, kind of way to make Internet policy which is again corresponding to the HRC. And I won't go in to the details but the idea is that we use this process. And out of thousands of participants we invite people to take contributions in to Working Group contributors and the censorship or the blockage involves four different layers. And for each layer they have to have answers to the existing law maker. And this is a better solution. And unless we have people who come up with an alternate solution they will always be more convenient for them to say IPR, TCP level.

So the fourth thing just very briefly is privacy. We work the content providers to do something that's very much like realtime, watermarking or things like that and leave the content out of the infrastructure layer. And finally Copyright Act. The administration can learn if we show them how to make that communication with people. So the idea is just to make rounds with the people.

>> GAYATRI KHANDHADAI: Smita had another question.

>> He basically answered everything. But I actually --  
(Laughter).

>> No. I -- you asked about the flow of information. So recently last December, in fact, there was a big flood in one of the cities. Network power went, everything went. Relief was happening from people who were outside the city and outside the state and there was quite a few alternative elements that was done by us. We didn't have the technology to do a crowd source information to say which is real and what is false. The people because they had connections to few people in the city you could just make sure that you amplify the information which is verified. If you share a verified piece of information ten times on Facebook it will reach five people and that is working really well. And it is a different situation. Yes, there was a disaster and this is during protest. So there will be elements which will have to be made to distinguish between them but this means more.

>> GAYATRI KHANDHADAI: Like they say most protests are disasters. Is there anything else that --

(Laughter).

>> GAYATRI KHANDHADAI: Is there anything else that you would like to comment on?

>> Thank you. I just have very short question coming back to the topic of shutdowns. I was wondering what is the justification of the Governments who shut down the networks. Any justification? In case of Taiwan it was a very peaceful demonstration but there might be demonstrations of a more violent character. I don't know.

>> Shutdowns, 70 shutdowns was -- it is because of a national security and maintain the social stability and to maintain not to provoke common violence. It has not been stated appropriately that

in what layers the shutdown has happened. For example, like in a cheating case they haven't come up with any kind of wholistic why it doesn't shut down. Why the application layer is overly blocking, what website has been blocked and this was blocked for a day. A day it has been blocked and then it is -- the question has to be there should be a proper mechanism from the Government as well why it has been blocked and what are the reasons they have been blocked and what level we are looking at as well. There is no listing that has come up from the Indian Government as well.

>> GAYATRI KHANDHADAI: Another question?

>> I wanted to also answer the question and make a further comment. Hi. I am Yasmin from Malaysia. I think that different countries have different requirements as to how far a Government needs to justify the actions and blocking. But I think those of us who live in shall we say less Democratic societies we recognize that at the end of the day the Government doesn't need to justify anything. That's the truth of the matter. In Malaysia, for example, our commission that regulates basically Internet affairs and also blocks like certain websites they do provide information as to why they are blocking certain websites but information is often incomplete. And in some cases they don't actually provide the information. For example, the Bersih website was blocked. They didn't provide justifications for that and sometimes they are retroactive justifications. They will only come up with a statement later if they do at all.

>> My name is Satish. There is a technical reason why stopping a network services may be useful. This is because there has been cases of terrorists detonating explosive devices using the public network. One of the reasons could be this. Thanks.

>> Sorry, basically I was just starting to realize what a problem it is. And I believe they should become an officer from India, especially I know one of the Chairman of Indian ISP associations were here but he could answer the question much better than I do. And the second is we listened to a lot of input from different stakeholders and eventually comment, make decision on its own. But you assume the condition that the Government would just ignore any voice but we realize the capacity building not only for an end user part but a public sector. Critical element in the investment development. They come here for learning to sharing the innovation and experience as well. And an opinion that we set up foundation, proposal from Asia one way is to do capacity building and the other is to provide infrastructure enabling. I encourage you to look at information provided by the APNIC Foundation. Some program could be useful not only for yourself but also for your common officer as well. Thank you.

>> Hello. Hi. I am Lang. I wanted to find out if anyone has any views on some more passive kinds of Government, interference of freedom of association and assembly. Where each and every phone

that -- I mean each and every SIM card which has an international mobile subscriber identity can be captured by a surveillance device that is placed at a protest and find out who is attending this protest. That's a passive way of disrupting the freedom of association and assembly and in countries like India where it is really hard to get any information about what surveillance technologies are being deployed and what justifications have absolutely no oversight. It is hard to get -- I mean to black box with -- you don't understand anything. If there is any thoughts or ideas. I wanted to bring that up.

>> Any responses to her question? Besides network shutdown, more subtle ways of surveillance?

>> Just one small instance that I heard in Pakistan there was a closed door meeting happening and there was this book sitting outside. And he activated through his phone, he activated somebody's phone sitting inside the room. And he started to listen to and he actually showed this to the person who was told me my friend actually. So I think there is some kind of technology advancement in that way going on. So I think I agree with what Nantara is saying, there is other ways that you need to look in to those as well.

>> GAYATRI KHANDHADAI: Is it okay if I respond to one of the questions, the detonating of bombs? This is one of those justifications states give that shocks you and you obviously can't argue with this because it sounds so scary that you don't want to engage with this question, but then my question would be is there at least some sort of perceivable or reasonable expectation that that's the case in all these -- in all these network shutdowns? Is there some basis by which they are coming to the confusion? That's one question. Second question is that the only way they can detonate the bomb? They are far more advanced than we are. They can use networks that are far more different. And there is also the question of the balancing. The pros and cons of doing something. Nica.

>> I just remembered something. I just remembered something about this proposal, no. To -- about protest in Asia. We don't have this practice of having a surveillance technology that can record, no, not surveillance, but can be -- I am recording -- recording what is happening in a protest action. But it is -- it is going -- its goal is to make sure that the police is not doing, you know, violence in dispersing protests. I am just floating this because I know in the U.S. and other western countries they have that where you can -- you make sure that the police are accountable to their actions. But in the -- in the case of -- of our region, it is not -- that's not happening and that's something that I think we can also talk about when it comes to privacy and protests. Like because in my experience we rely on the media to cover or to protect us, no. To just have their camera there. If something happened to us the media will be able to capture it. If Asia where there is corporate media, yeah, they will just

record what they want to -- what they want to -- I mean that can look good for the Government and not really -- not really covering or exposing what's really happening on the ground. So that's something that I think we can also look at because I remember this is already talked about in this Round Table discussion with the UN Special Rapporteur, you know, about technology and protests. So I don't know what -- I haven't really thought about it. But, you know, maybe we can also talk about it.

>> GAYATRI KHANDHADAI: I am going to respond to you as I pass the mic because there is a really serious issue there as well. When the Saba movement happened and then occupy sort of thing that happened in Bangladesh, 16, 17 people according to different reports, different numbers was shot and killed but the thing there was a network shutdown. The media was not able to send images out because it was pitch dark and nobody could record what was happening. That's an additional danger of not being able to send information out. That's an integral part of that issue there.

>> I think that's a double-edged sword kind of us capturing the softphone evolution. Locate them in protests and use that. That also happened I think in the earlier days of Bersih and Malaysia where videos captured during protests then used to further put people in to trouble. So I think that's a great, kind of like taking in to consideration the context of like corporate media in our countries and the nontransparency in the way these things are covered but also kind of like the other end of the spectrum which is -- it actually might be used to further have offline effects on people who are protesting as well.

>> Thank you. Last month I was in Spain to talk with activists who occupy the 15M movement which was in Spain and then occupiers. We are enablers of this kind of occupy our protesting. And one thing that we learned over our mistakes and some successes was that we -- we only go to the super public way of surveillance and recording everything by yourself when you have critical mass and you know you are winning. And if you can't afford critical, nonradical violence, but during the early day, when the students decided to occupy also the administration building and when we have cameras that occupy with the students and students and police behaved civilized but the other thing it became very violent and was a lot of political brutality, but because both are happening the violence narrative would win and it would get drawn out. So I think one of the lessons is that one should -- or we need to keep to the lower case Internet, the private or mesh networking where we have guaranteed or somewhat confident security, not rely on the public Internet infrastructure. And when we have the radical nonviolence critical mass we switch to very public and visible way to communicate in to the public.

>> GAYATRI KHANDHADAI: So we have Ming and then there is one question from a remote user and then after that I'm afraid we will

have to wrap up.

>> I think I want to share my experience with the protests in Vietnam that I used to organise, to be one of the organisers of the protests and it was really successful. But I have to say that the social media and the Internet is somehow like double sided, bad side and good side. After that we know that one of the protests were organised by the Government. They send police to organise and protest to collect the information of some of the protestors. And like I am one of the -- the one who is in the group and all the name of the people inside the group were in the black base of the police. So it is really -- you need to be really careful about when you are organising something on Facebook or on the Internet. Secondly like when it -- the Livestreaming is really useful. The police come and violence and hit you, and if there is someone to record it, it is evidence and this is really good for the campaign, when the people see how people are cheating and -- but it also can be like the privacy of being there. And now when every time they have a protest the police in Vietnam they bring a lot of cameras and just like journalists and point out the camera, the face and ask the question and who are you and why you are here and people answer the question because they don't know why police are informed.

I have to say that the Vietnam Government is really smart in using this social media and they have a lot blocked. They have seen a huge amount of people, the block, they are a blocker and they give out a lot of information just like protestor. But again the other protestor in trying to make the conflict between the protestor. Yeah. So it is really hard for us in Vietnam working at it.

>> (Off microphone)

(Laughter).

>> GAYATRI KHANDHADAI: Okay. So we have got the last four minutes and we have one remote question. How are counterterrorism activities used against freedom of expression and freedom of assembly? I think we have been discussing, but would you like to answer that?

>> In the beginning I gave the example of reclaiming the mosques campaign that we started on Facebook. So this was actually a counterterrorism activity because this clergy in the mosque was giving very extremist ideas and clearly supporting ISIS and asking the Government to declare Jihad and all that sort. So that campaign actually started around the idea that he is not representing the real interpretation of the religion and the religious space is for the people, for the users, for the religious followers to go on a worship. Let's reclaim our space and have radical people move out of our spaces. So that was a very -- I think very positive and successful example of counterterrorism I would say in the country. And it actually got much appreciation as well even being the conservative society I would say. That was a very good example.

>> GAYATRI KHANDHADAI: Okay. So we have to wrap up. Thank you.

This has been a really thoroughly interesting and exciting conversation we have had across. I'm sorry if we weren't able to accommodate any comments or anything else. Just to close up I wanted to request you that this is actually the issue that we feel very strongly about. And we would really appreciate it if you could find ways to collaborate with as many of you as possible, because more friends are better than less friends and more allies are better than less allies. And it would be great if you have ideas would how we can engage with multi-stakeholders and how we can approach the Government and together we can do something about this and/or if there is experiences in your countries that you would like to share with us or if you would like us to also see how we can share our work with you, please let us know. We will still be around for the next couple of days. We can catch up and see what we can do together. Thank you so much. And have a wonderful evening.

(Applause.)

(Session concluded at 1726 p.m.)

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